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Watchful Waiting: U.S. Neutrality Law in the Atlantic World: 1815-1819. 
This paper addressed the ways in which American statesmen responded to 
the diplomatic crisis of American citizens serving as privateers for the 
rebelling countries of South America during the South American Wars for 
Independence. Most specifically, this paper analyzes the strategy of 
President James Monroe, who crafted a elastic and flexible policy of 
“watchful waiting,” which allowed the state to capitalize on events and 
situations in U.S. favor without bringing the nation into war with Spain. From 
a position of international weakness, U.S. statesmen were able to take 
advantage of the crisis caused by American privateers and, in the process, 






Money Bags and Cannon Balls: The First Bribery War and the Expansion of 
American Presidential Power 
This paper analyzes the expansion of presidential power witnessed during 
the Thomas Jefferson administration during the First Barbary War of 1801-
1805. During the Early Republic, American shipping faced piratical actions 
from the various Regencies of the Barbary Coast, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis 
and Tripoli. Jefferson sought to break from the noncombative precedent of 
his Federalist predecessors by directly engaging the Barbary corsairs. In 
taking the fight to the Mediterranean, Jefferson transformed the role of the 
executive. The demands of war forced Jefferson to empower the 
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Chapter 1: Intellectual Bibliography  
 
 
During the 2017-2018 academic year, I worked to complete the necessary 
coursework needed to earn a Master’s Degree in American History at the College of 
William and Mary. In addition to a course on the Historian’s Craft, and three reading 
classes covering topics such as Southern History, Vast Early America, and Early Native 
American History, the major element of my degree works consists two thesis written in 
the Fall 2017 and Spring 2018. These projects, roughly between 20-30 pages each, 
represent research conducted in American foreign affairs during the Early Republic. 
Although I came to William and Mary with no previous scholarly training at the graduate 
level, these papers have provided me the opportunity to make modest contributions to 
the historical narrative surrounding early 19th century American diplomacy. 
 I came to William and Mary with a strong desire to professionalize my passion for 
history. For the previous four years before enrolling in the graduate history program, I 
taught American History at a private all-male boarding school in foothills of Virginia’s 
Blue Ridge Mountains. Teaching is my life’s passion, and this drive to become the best 
educator possible inspired me earn my Master’s Degree in history at William and Mary.  
 My teaching background greatly influenced my time at William and Mary. As a 
teacher, it is my goal to make history as enlightening, fun, and illuminating as possible 
for my future students. Therefore, both the classes I chose as my reading seminars and 
the topics studied for my research portfolio were inspired by my desire to make my 
experience at William and Mary as practical as possible for my career. Thus, I chose 
classes and topics that corresponded with subjects I will teach in the future and 
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research topics that would exciting to teach high schoolers who might think history a 
boring subject. Whereas many of my classmates came into this academic year with a 
clear sense of what kind of historian they sought to be, I came in as a generalist who 
sought stories and topics that I would be able to make exciting for my future high school 
students. 
 Thus, lacking an identity as a specific type of historian, I was free to choose a 
topic within the Atlantic World theme that most excited me. Wanting to stay in American 
history and thinking that pirates were fascinating, I began to investigate American 
pirates in the Atlantic World. Thanks to Professor Prado’s help, I found that American 
privateers greatly impacted the direction of U.S. foreign policy after the War of 1812. In 
a paper entitled “Watchful Waiting: U.S. Neutrality Law in the Atlantic World: 1815-
1819.” I investigated the role American privateers operating during the Age of 
Revolution played in dictating U.S. neutrality laws after the War of 1812. These 
privateers, hired by South American revolutionaries to harass Spanish maritime forces, 
threaten America’s fragile peace with Spain. My main observation in this paper was 
that, in the hands of skilled American diplomats, U.S. neutrality was situated on a sliding 
scale. These American statesmen pursued expansionist policies that pushed right up 
against neutrality in ways that empowered the state while at the same time avoided war 
with Spain. Thus, what began as a very general interest in pirates transformed into an 
investigation into the changing dynamics of U.S. neutrality law during the Early 
Republic. No doubt my students will someday benefit from my work analyzing the role 
swashbuckling American pirates-for-hire played in facilitating expansionist U.S. policies 
after 1812.  
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 Due to my experience looking into the maritime aspects of U.S overseas policy, 
during the Spring semester in Professor Middleton’s Colonial America class, I continued 
to investigate American foreign policy during the Early Republic. The topic I eventually 
chose is not a direct relation to my Fall paper, however, there are some similarities. This 
Spring, I looked into American foreign policy as seen through the Barbary War of 1801-
1805. This topic began with an interest in the military actions of this understudied U.S. 
engagement, but it later matured into a paper about Thomas Jefferson’s evolving 
character as Commander in Chief.  This paper was called “Money Bag and Cannon 
Balls: The First Bribery War and the Expansion of American Presidential Power.” 
Condensing Jefferson’s ideological complexities into a coherent thesis statement 
represented a challenge this semester, as I am concerned that my argument was not as 
tight as it could have been. Nevertheless, I was pleased in my attempt to illustrate that 
change Jefferson underwent as America’s first wartime leader. After the loss of the 
300+ man crew of the USS Philadelphia to Tripoli, Jefferson took on policies and tactics 
that challenged his republican ideology. Within this paper, one of my main realizations 
was the fact that Jefferson pursued Republican-inspired foreign policy objectives 
through Federalist-inspired means. In order to achieve victory in North Africa, Jefferson 
expanded the power of the presidency far beyond that of his Federalist predecessors.  
 I did not intend to write two papers about American foreign policy post 1800. My 
primary area of interest in American History revolves around the Gilded Age and Cold 
War. However, this year, William and Mary’s course list this academic year was 
thematically limited by classes that primarily addressed  topics regarding early American 
history. Thus, although I view myself as a generalist, my one year at William and Mary 
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did allow me to pursue topics that truly engaged my favorite areas of history. In both the 
Fall and Spring semesters, I found topics that examined America’s role in the world from 
positions of international weakenss. As I am not interested in perusing my academic 
career into the Ph.D level, I do not intend on publishing either of these papers. As being 
the best secondary teacher that I can be is my primary concern, having these papers 
published is not a concern of mine. That being said, writing these papers has been a 
tremendous learning experience for me. Not only have I honed my skill as a writer and 
researcher, but I have also regained some sympathy for my future students who will 
have to write the papers I assign them. Thanks to graduate school, I will be better 

















Chapter 2 -  Watchful Waiting: U.S. Neutrality Law in the Atlantic World: 1815-1819. 
David Curtis DeForest must have chuckled quietly to himself as he read the 
morning newspaper in his New Haven home. It was December 3rd, 1823, and the 
Atlantic World was waking up to the news of President James Monroe’s “declaration” 
the previous day.1 For almost two decades, DeForest was an adventure-capitalist in 
Buenos Aires, a duel merchant-diplomat career created in the political chaos of the 
South American Wars of Independence that began in 1810.2 After cutting his teeth 
learning how to do business “the smuggling way” in Brazil, DeForest made Buenos 
Aires his adopted home.3 He amassed such a fortune from his extralegal activities that 
he was able to retire in 1818, and move back to his native home in New Haven, 
Connecticut. As DeForest read the words of what will become known as the Monroe 
Doctrine, it is not hard to imagine that memories of his own role in the creation of the 
doctrine rushed warmly into his mind. Now, an old man at 51, the “Don” read that 
Monroe was formally closing a period of free-wheeling reactionary politics that had 
allowed merchants and privateers alike to prosper.4 Snuggled warmly in the New 
                                                      
1 James Monroe, The Monroe Doctrine,” Address, December 2, 1823. Quoted in, James P. 
Lucier. The Political Writings of James Monroe. Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2001. 637. 
2 Historians and scholars of 19th century South America do not agree on what to call this period of 
revolutionary activity against Spain. From 1810 to 1825, South Americans fought to gain their 
impendence. The many different leaders, states, goals, and outcomes associated with Latin American 
independent movement makes it difficult to characterize in broad terms this vast and diverse revolutionary 
age. In light of this difficulty, I will use the term “South American Wars for Impendence” to refer to the 
collective struggle for Latin American independence. Although impendence movements arose from 
Mexico to Argentina, this paper focuses on the South American republics, as their struggle tested U.S. 
neutrality the most.  
3 Benjamin Keen. David Curtis DeForest and the Revolution of Buenos Aires. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1947. 15. 
4 I will use the term “privateer” to refer to American sailors who were officially contracted by South 
American revolutionary government to raid and disrupt Spanish imperial vessels. These privateers 
operated under government sanctioned letter of marque, that legitimized their activities on the high seas. 
Any bounty or money gained by these actions were to be distributed in prize courts operated in both 
North and South American ports. The contract-relationship aspect of privateering is one of the major 
differences separating these sailors-for-hire from the more lawless pirate, who acted without the consent 
of any government. Head, “New Nations, New Connections,”164-5. 
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England mansion paid for by profits earned through his South American exploits, 
DeForest no doubt read Monroe’s doctrine as the official end to a dangerous and 
unstable diplomatic era he had helped to create and exploit.5  
 Historians of 19th century America have often portrayed the1823 Monroe 
Doctrine as a great beginning, a “diplomatic declaration of independence” that 
unshackled the United States from European control.6 Henry Cabot Lodge, speaking in 
1883, proclaimed that “the Monroe Doctrine bore witness to the strong foreign policy of 
an independent people.”7 What the Monroe Doctrine did, was in 954 words, tell 
Europe’s imperial governments that any future attempts to colonize the Western 
Hemisphere would be considered by the United States of America as a danger to 
America’s “peace and safety.”8 Thanks to hindsight, it is not difficult to see this bold 
proclamation to Europe by a minor regional power as the foundational step in the United 
States’ rise to global superpower. Most of all, because it worked. After 1823, the major 
powers of Europe, England, France and Spain did not attempt to colonize the American 
continents. They did not deter the continued liberalization of free trade. Finally, they did 
not stop American expansion.9  
 However, to see the Monroe Doctrine solely through the lens of American 
exceptionalism, blurs the important context in which it was created. The U.S. during the 
Early Republic was still a minor military power with little less than a coast guard for a 
navy and no large standing army to speak off.10 In the four decades since declaring 
                                                      
 5 Keen, 166-8. 
6 Jay sexton. The Monroe Doctrine. New York: Hill and Wang Publishing, 2011. 54. 
7 Henry Cabot Lodge, quoted in, Sexton 53. 
8 Monroe, “The Monroe Doctrine.” Lucier, 638. 
9 Sexton, 56. 
10 Stephen M. Chambers. No God but Gain: The Untold Story of Cuban Slavery, the Monroe 
Doctrine, and the Making of the United States. New York: Verso Publishing, 2015. 16. 
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independence, the U.S. had been invaded twice by England, had its capital burn, and 
got involved in an undeclared naval war with France. American foreign policy since its 
founding had been largely reactionary, acting off of and responding to the interventionist 
politics that characterized European diplomacy. Born out of the transatlantic Wars for 
South American Independence, the Monroe Doctrine was an attempt by American 
statesmen to end the instability that had threatened their policy making. Therefore, 
rather than seeing the Monroe Doctrine as the beginning of American power, the 
Monroe Doctrine was actually created to end an era of Atlantic World volatility, 
detrimental to U.S. state building during the Early Republic. Influenced by both fear of 
European interventionism and hopeful nationalistic opportunism, James Monroe and his 
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, penned a proactive and anticolonial doctrine 
that not only helped stabilized transatlantic relations but also ended the threat of war 
that had been a defining feature influencing U.S. policy since 1776.11 Monroe, Adams, 
and their doctrine thus represented a culminating achievement for their view of 
republican state building after the War of 1812.  
 However, if the 1823 doctrine was the climax, then how did American leaders, 
who did not share a united vision for state-building, arrive at such a grand and impactful 
consensus? Such a strong statement was actually the result of an influential period of 
weakness. From 1815, when peace returned after the War of 1812, to the establishment 
of the Transcontinental Treaty in 1819, American leaders faced very real threats of war 
in their efforts to accomplish various economic and territorial goals. With the return of 
peace, expansionist politicians wanted to take advantage of the political and economic 
                                                      
11 Sexton, 55.  
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chaos created by the South American Wars for Independence by deepening American 
commercial interests in Latin American while at the same time acquiring land from 
Spanish Florida.12 War, however, would ruin the plans men like Monroe, Adams, and 
Henry Clay had for the nation’s future strength and security.13 Thus, the period between 
1815 and 1819 represented a dangerous and unstable time when U.S. political elites 
made conscious efforts to strengthen and protect the still nascent American state.14 In 
claiming neutrality, American statesmen were creating a self-serving balance between 
direct action and noninterventionism that allowed the state to achieve valuable 
economic and diplomatic goals. Embedded in this unique style of American neutrality 
was a strategic flexibility that allowed policy elites to safely maneuver a chaotic Atlantic 
environment filled with the threat of war.15 As the U.S. sought recovery and peace after 
the War of 1812, Monroe and Adams used a flexible and sometimes contradictory 
neutrality law to define and strengthen the American state in the Early Republic.  
Historians’ interest in American interactions in the Atlantic first peaked in the 
World War Era. Given the U.S.’s own neutral proclamations during the 1910s and 
1940s, it is not surprising that historians were deeply considering and writing about a 
time in America’s past when geopolitics threatened the state’s neutrality. The first 
historian to define America’s relationship with South America was Charles Lyon 
Chambers. Chambers, a Harvard professor who studied in South America. In 1917, he 
                                                      
12 Charles Carrol Griffin . The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810-
1822. New York: Columbia University Press, 1937. 143. 
13 John Quincy Adams, diary entry, January 19, 1818. The Memoirs of John Quincy Adams: His 
Diary from 1795 to 1848, edited by Adams, Charles Francis. Vol. Vol. 4. New York: Books for Library 
Press, 1874. 43. 
14 Gary Hart. James Monroe. New York: Times Books. 2005. 77-79. 
15 The Neutrality Act of 1794 would be the first time a government codified the exact obligations 
and duties of a neutral nation. American neutrality would also be unique in that it attached strict penalties 
to violators, thus connecting neutrality to the criminal code of the United States.  
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wrote Inter-American Acquaintances, the text that began American’s scholarly interest 
in the Atlantic South. Written in 1941, Arthur K. Whitaker’s 612-page tome, U.S. and the 
Independence of Latin America 1800-1830, quickly became a foundational work in the 
theme of American-South American studies. Whitaker acknowledges the similarity 
between America in the 1820s and the 1940s, and claims that when discussing the 
broad themes of the era, one could substitute “’totalitarianism’ for ‘monarchical’ and 
‘democracy’ for ‘republicanism.’”16 Given this dire geopolitical environment in which he 
was writing, Whitaker’s expansive study highlights in moral terms America’s leading role 
in transatlantic relations.  
Historians in the war years were actively thinking about America’s neutral 
position in the Atlantic World, and their various works reflect the politics of the day. One 
of the earliest attempts to chronical the development of American neutrality laws was 
written in 1913 by Charles Fenwick. The Neutrality Laws of the United States takes an 
academic approach at conceptualizing what was and was not America’s role as a 
neutral nation throughout its history. Another approach taken by these early historians 
was to conceptualize America as taking a leading role in South American affairs. “Pan-
Americanism” is the subject of Laura Bornholdt’s Baltimore and Early Pan-Americanism. 
Written in 1949, Bornholdt’s analysis of America leading a coalition of American states 
was likely influenced by the formation of NATO that same year. Charles Carrol Griffin’s 
1937 text, The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822 is 
emblematic of the general approach taken by historians at that time. Griffin’s focuses on 
the power politics of the nation-state, lumping all policies and attitudes under the broad 
                                                      
16 Arthur P. Whitaker. The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1941. Vii. 
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national characters of “the United States, Spain, and Spanish America.”17 Later 
historians will give more agency to the individuals who actually did the 19th century 
politicking.  
In recent years, scholars have reengaged this area of study. Responding to 
Benedict Anderson’s reconceptualization of nationalism, current scholarship takes a 
much closer look at the various identities and cross-cultural interactions represented in 
the history of America-in-the-Atlantic. Emblematic of this approach is Caitlin Fitz’s 2016 
work, Our Sister Republics. In her book, Fitz expertly chronicles the rise and fall of 
American public opinion towards the South American independence movement through 
U.S. media coverage of revolutionary leaders like Simón Bolívar.18 Americans who 
toasted patriot victories and named their babies Bolívar were projecting their own 
republican ideology onto the South American struggle, and in doing so, refined their 
own sense of American republicanism. Along these same lines, historian Matthew 
Karp’s work, This Vast Southern Empire, analyzes the impact South American relations 
had in the creation of a separate brand of Southern politics. Karp argues that few 
Americans in the 19th century were more in tune with geopolitics than Southern 
politicians, and that the South had an oversized role in shaping the nature and direction 
of American foreign policy.19 Thus, given the South’s strong grip on federal positions of 
power, Southern statesmen were able to create a U.S. nationalism that was not only 
benevolent to domestic slavery but also protective of the foreign slavery in the Atlantic.20          
                                                      
17 Griffin, 5. 
18 Caitlin Fitz. Our Sister Republics: The United States in an Age of American Revolutions. New 
York: Liverlight Publishing Corporation, 2016. 9-11. 
19 Matthew Karp. This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign 
Policy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016, 3. 
20 Karp, 5. 
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The other direction recent historians have taken in the field of America-in-the-
Atlantic is to stress the growth of American state power in transnationalist terms. 
Stephan Chambers’ No God but Gain, highlights the role “the generation of 1815” 
played in connecting American future success to the Cuban slave trade.21 By separating 
the statesmen from their Founding predecessors, Chambers argues that the “15ers” 
used the lucrative Cuban slave trade fuel the creation of their new brand of American 
nationalism, one that relied on transatlantic commercial connections.22 Historian David 
Head shows this transnationalist influence in a different light, highlighting the role 
individuals played in connecting Atlantic communities. In Privateers of the Americas, 
Head argues that studying privateers allows a much clearer view of how the U.S. 
interacted in a rapidly dissolving imperial Atlantic community. Whereas many historians 
leave out the smaller actors in favor of aggrandizing the elite policymakers, Head shows 
that these diverse privateers not only had agency but also impacted the direction of 
Atlantic History. In this way, Head hopes to use the aggressive individualism of 
privateers to bridge the gap between historians of the Atlantic World and the 
Americanists of the Early Republic period.23 Head, as well as Chambers, have helped to 
move American Atlantic studies into the Caribbean, and they have made great 
contributions looking at the impact trade with that region had on domestic politics and 
American foreign policy. 
These works represent the significant scholarship being done in the expanding 
field of America-in-the-Atlantic. Though all different in their focus, these historians all 
                                                      
21 Chambers, 3. 
22 Chambers, 5-6. 
23 David Head. Privateers of the Americas: Spanish American Privateering from the United States 
in the Early Republic. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015. 5-8. 
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engage the diverse factors responsible for creating national identities in the Early 
Republic. This paper will continue the historiographical themes expressed in the current 
literature by positioning the years 1815-1819 as a moment of state building intentionally 
designed by a small cohort of the American political elite. Far from unified in their end 
goals, these statesmen sought to use America’s neutral status as a means to achieve 
substantial goals in the areas of trade and territory. The factors aiding and inhibiting the 
achievement of these strategic aims will occupy this paper’s focus. Past and current 
historians have largely overlooked the role neutrality law played in U.S. state-building. 
While many do engage neutrality as factor in post 1812 Atlantic, scholars talk of the old 
1794 Neutrality Law and its 1818 revision as minor steps that help lead to the eventual 
big policy event of the Monroe Doctrine. On the other hand, much ink has been spent 
analyzing the significance of the Monroe Doctrine as its impact on U.S. history. Yet, 
looking only at the big events obscures the significant context that allowed such bold 
declaration to be made in 1823 by a minor Atlantic power. By focusing on the role 
neutrality law played in a time of great fragility and uncertainty, this paper will reposition 
neutrality as a significant and central tool in the hands of skilled policymakers. 
Therefore, by centralizing the role these laws played, this paper will illustrate how, from 
a position of international weakness, U.S. presidents and statesmen leveraged a 
contradictory and flexible neutrality law to not only avoid war but also secure the 
expansion of U.S. trade and territory. 
* * * * * 
 
In 1792, Europe exploded into revolutionary war. Responding to the French 
Revolution, the monarchal powers across Europe summoned their armies to challenge 
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this threat.24 Across the Atlantic, the young United States of America watched Europe 
burn with growing unrest. Having recently secured independence in 1783, the war-
weary nation could not afford to fight in another European war. In response to this 
existential threat, President George Washington addressed the Congressional elite in 
1793, informing them that it was now “the duty and interest of the United States . . . to 
sincerely and with good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards 
the belligerent powers.”25 To help protect his newborn country, Washington envisioned 
a hand off approach to foreign policy. Washington believed that the U.S. should honor 
“with perfect good faith” all foreign commercial relationships, but avoid permanent 
alliances with European nations, as “a passionate attachment of one Nation for another” 
could lead to either unnecessary war or disadvantages in future treaty negotiations.26 As 
his second and final term as president came to a close in 1796, Washington penned a 
parting letter to the American people that would greatly impact the direction and 
character of American foreign relations for the next century.27 In what would be known 
as his “Farewell Address,” Washington elaborated on his ideas about a neutral foreign 
policy, stating that “the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations, is, in 
extending our commercial relations, to have with [Europe] as little political connections 
as possible . . . hence, therefore it is unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial 
ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collision 
                                                      
24 Charles S. Hyneman "Neutrality during the European Wars of 1792-1815: America's 
Understanding of Her Obligations." The American Journal of International Law Vol 24., No. 2 (April 1930): 
279-309. 297. 
25 George Washington Congressional Address, April 22, 1793. Quoted in Charles G Fenwick. The 
Neutrality Laws of the United States. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment Publishing, 1913. 17. 
26 Ferrell. 89. 
27 Charles G Fenwick. The Neutrality Laws of the United States. Washington D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment Publishing, 1913. 16. 
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of her friendships or enmities.”28 Without saying the word “neutrality,” Washington set 
the foundation for a particular and unique brand of noninterventionist neutrality that 
focused on both “extending commercial relations” and avoiding war.29 Therefore, due to 
Washington’s vision of foreign relations, economic interest was born in U.S. neutrally 
from the beginning.  
Congress solidified Washington’s vision in the 1794 Neutrality Act. This 
legislation officially prevented American citizens from “engaging in, or preparing for, 
hostilities against any power, with which the United States was at peace.”30 This was a 
significant move by the U.S. government, for it represented the most comprehensive 
and formal declaration by a state to define the actions and obligations of international 
neutrality. Furthermore, it also significantly incorporated these acts into the criminal 
code, providing harsh penalties for those who violated American laws.31 This high 
standard would later be praised by famed British diplomat Lord George Canning, who 
said that “if I wished for a guide in the system of Neutrality, I should take that laid down 
by the presidency of Washington.”32  
 Washington’s commerce–focused vision of neutral foreign relations served the 
American economy well in the years after his presidency. As events in the Atlantic 
continued to disrupt European mercantilist control over their New World markets, the 
neutral U.S. merchant marine eagerly jumped at the opportunity to extend trade 
                                                      
28 George Washington Farewell Address, quoted in, William R., Manning, ed.  Diplomatic 
Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1925. 15. 
29 Hyneman. 281. 
30 Griffin, 97. 
31 Fenwick, 27. 
32 Lord George Canning, quoted in, Fenwick 28. 
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networks to South America.33 At the beginning of the 19th century, U.S. commerce in 
Latin America swelled, with American businessmen regularly trading with major Spanish 
colonial ports as far south as Venezuela and the Rio de la Plata.34 In the years after 
Washington’s Farewell Address, U.S. commercial interests began to be connected to 
state security, as Latin American trade networks served as a major factor in overcoming 
the massive war debt amassed during the Revolutionary War. As historian Stephan 
Chambers put it, “if the national debt was the price of [American] independence, then 
U.S-Cuba trade represented an expeditious opportunity for the new nation to begin to 
settle its accounts.”35 This reliance on Latin American trade tied American commercial 
interests with national security, connection that would both aid and jeopardize American 
neutrality in the years to come.  
French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion into Spain in 1808 became a 
turning point in the direction of American neutrality, as it would tie American commercial 
interests closer to South American markets. Not only did it serve to further weaken 
Spanish imperial control over free trade, but the war necessity also created an immense 
demand for American goods in Europe.36 By late 1808, American imports to the Spanish 
Peninsula were three times greater than Latin American trade.37 Commander of the 
English Peninsular forces, the Duke of Wellington, noted the impact U.S. trade made on 
his war effort, commenting that “all this part of the [Spanish] Peninsula has been living 
                                                      
33 The United States had been trading with South American colonies since before Impendence. 
However, before the French Revolution of 1789, Spain had a much tighter grip on its mercantilist 
monopolies. Thus, if American merchants wanted to sell flour shipments to Cuba, they would first have to 
go through Spain first. Peggy Liss. Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolution, 1713-1826. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1982, 173. 
34 The Rio de la Plata region incorporates modern day Argentina. Liss, 173-4. 
35 Chambers, 21. 
36 Griffin, 98. 
37 Whitaker, 52. 
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in American flour.”38 This “revolution in commerce” helped to “awaken” American 
leaders to the economic possibilities of strong commercial relationship with South 
America.39 No city benefited more from this awakening than Baltimore, who’s population 
from 1790-1800 more than doubled, making it the third largest city in the U.S. by 1812. 
Locals during this time claimed that trade transformed their city into a thriving market 
where “fortunes were accumulated as if by magic.”40 Thus, in the early years of the 19th 
century, Atlantic war equated to a lucrative financial opportunity for a neutral America, 
as merchants and politicians sought to use the neutral label to advance their interests.41 
In the years to come, this behavior would come to threaten national security, as 
statesmen would stretch neutrality to the breaking point. 
Napoleon’s actions did not just impact North Americans. In the south, a string of 
revolutions erupted in 1810 and spread across the continent. These uprisings produced 
leaders like Simón Bolívar of Venezuela, José de San Martín of Argentina, and 
Bernardo O’Higgins of Chile, destined to liberate their native lands from Spanish rule. 
As U.S. economic power grew more tightly connected to Latin American ports, policy 
leaders from the United States watched these revolutions very closely.42 In 1810, 
President James Madison began the practice of commissioning U.S. diplomats as 
                                                      
38 Liss, 173. 
39 Whitaker, 26. 
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“agents” to serve state interests in the newly formed patriot governments. Given the title 
“agent for commerce and seamen,” William Shaler became America’s first Latin 
American agent, appointed to serve in the port of Vera Cruz.43 Realizing that America 
“cannot be [an] unfeeling spectator [to] such an important moment,” Secretary of State 
James Monroe commissioned two more agents to South American posts, adding Robert 
Lowery to serve in Caracas and Joel Poinsett in Buenos Aires.44 As “agents” these men 
operated in the commercial interests of the American government. However, they did 
not work for the American government as state-sponsored “consuls,” as the patriot 
governments were still unrecognized within the international community.45 David 
DeForest, for example, was repeatedly rejected in his attempts to gain a consulship in 
Buenos Aires, but nevertheless regularly petitioned powerful American merchants John 
Jacob Astor and DeWitt Clinton to tie their North American wealth to his South 
American business ventures.46 By employing “agents” and not “consuls, “the  U.S. 
symbolically distanced itself from the rebel republics, and in doing so, helped to 
maintain the veneer of impartiality.47 However, by expanding and deepening the U.S. 
economic reach into Latin American market, these early American diplomat-merchants 
were actually threatening future Atlantic peace, as these transformed into the point-men 
in charge of recruiting a generation of American adventurers to become privateers.48 
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 The War of 1812 was a transformative experience for the provincial American 
state. Although it did not significantly change the map, the peace created in1815 
significantly impacted the direction of American power in the coming years in two 
important ways. War with Great Britain facilitated the recruitment of a large number of 
sailors to combat the Royal Navy. When peace was secured in 1815, many of these 
seasoned navy men would ply their skills as licensed privateers against Spain. The war 
also positioned the U.S. for future conflict with Imperial Spain. Building off of lingering 
tensions over disputed Louisiana Purchase territory, 1815 peace will come to place new 
stains on Spanish-American relationship. The War of 1812 helped turn American 
commercial interests south, and in doing so, it positioned the U.S. economic 
expansionist leaders in direct conflict Spain, who still controlled those markets.49  
Inflated with nationalist pride after the War of 1812, American statesmen will, under the 
banner of neutrally, attempt to build the state by pushing against their Spanish 
neighbors.50 However, this pushing will threaten a war that could ruin all their goals for 
expanding American power economically and territorially.  
* * * * * 
For U.S. statesmen, peace in 1815 did not lessen the threat of future hostilities in 
the Atlantic. In response to the ongoing Wars of South American Independence, 
American President James Madison was quick to declare the United States’ neutrality in 
the conflict.51 Citing the Neutrality Act of 1794, Madison kept open American ports to all 
vessels, including those of the South American revolutionaries, outlawing only the 
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arming and direct recruiting of sailors for those war-bound ships. The U.S. Government 
also directly forbid its citizens from participating in the conflict via privateering or 
filibustering.52 Although he formally claimed neutrality, Madison did not promise 
impartiality, as he actually expanded on Washington’s commerce-focused neutrality to 
meet the growing economic needs of his expansionist government. The original act in 
1794 only mentioned “foreign princes and states,” as governing sovereigns with which a 
neutral America could do business.53 Madison expanded the interpretation of America’s 
neutral obligations to include rebelling colonies as legitimate governments.54 The U.S. 
government never claimed the South American governments were legitimate, but the 
U.S. ports, who welcomed ships flying all flags, treated them as such. This bold and 
loose interpretation of the original act further shows that American neutrality after 1815 
was a flexible entity. By engaging in a loose reading of American neutrality, Madison 
wielded a commercially-friendly neutrality that aimed to meet the South American 
Revolution’s dangers and opportunities.  
The threat of European intervention terrified American leaders, and Madison’s 
vague language sought to lessen the threat of war while at the same time expanding 
America’s peace time economy.55 Adams captures this fear in his private letter to friend 
William Plummer. “We have therefore enemies in almost every part of the world, and 
few or no friends anywhere . . . with Spain we are . . . on the verge of war.”56 This 
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anxiety influenced the American political elite, who saw war with Spain as disastrous to 
their expansionist visions. Thus, the Madison administration deliberately sculpted a 
federal policy toward South American that was officially neutral, but this neutrality was 
not intended to be strictly impartial, as trade with both warring governments was 
encouraged by U.S. statesmen.  
In addition to the state’s aggressive economic and territorial goals, there were a 
host of internal and external factors the made a strict and impartial neutrality nearly 
impossible after 1815. Public opinion at this time weighed heavily in favor of the South 
American patriots. Seeing a connection to their own revolution of 1776, many American 
citizens toasted their “sister republics” down south in a shared sense of republican 
triumph.57 One Washington newspaper proclaimed that by 1816 toasts to South 
American success were nearly “universal.” Historian Caitlin Fitz compiled records of the 
nation’s leading newspapers at the time, and concluded that beginning in 1815, around 
the Unites States there were more than 70 toasts offered on the Fourth of July for 
hemispheric independence.58 Popular opinion for patriot success even became a 
personal matter, as towns and newborn babies were named “Bolívar,” after the 
revolutionary general Simón Bolívar.59 Hero of the Battle of New Orleans and famed 
Indian fighter, Andrew Jackson even named his favorite horse after the great South 
American “Liberator.”60 The hundreds of toasts, songs, poems, and baby names that 
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were created at that time clearly illustrate the overwhelming support the U.S. populace 
had for the South American “sister republics.”  
Whereas the general public could drunkenly toast Bolivar’s fight, the political elite 
in Washington could not be so blatant in their support, as they were in charge of 
maintaining the U.S.’s neutral position. In a private correspondence with John Quincy 
Adams in 1815, Secretary of State Monroe wrote, “in the event that their independence 
would be free and friendly [relationship] . . . there is no cause to doubt in which scale 
our interest lies.”61 Although U.S. leaders were rarely this candid in discussing their 
support, they were more open in voicing their negative opinion of Spain. A dangerous 
tension with Spain first began after President Thomas Jefferson’s 1803 Louisiana 
Purchase, an exchange Spanish ministers called “illegal” and “the most traitorous blow 
that Bonaparte ever dealt the Spanish Monarchy.”62 Various territorial disputes along 
the Mississippi River and Florida border eventually forced Secretary of State Madison to 
sever diplomatic negotiations with Spanish minister Marqués de Casa Irujo.63 Although 
formal, yet cool, communications formally returned in 1809 with the arrival of Spanish 
minister Don Luis de Onís, the U.S. Government remained hostile to the Spanish 
ministry.64 Therefore, from the Oval Office to the maternity ward, American society at 
nearly every level supported the patriot fight against Spain, illustrating the internal 
emotions that made maintaining U.S. impartiality difficult to uphold. 
 Given America’s hostile opinion of Spain, enthusiastic support for the “sister 
republics,” and a commercially-focused neutrality policy, external challenges to the 
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U.S.’s delicate neutrality arose almost immediately after 1815. The most significant 
danger came from U.S. citizens serving as privateers for the unrecognized South 
American governments. With no navies of their own, these states enthusiastically 
encouraged men like DeForest to commission American sailors and veterans from the 
War of 1812 to serve as privateers against Spanish imperial ships.65 Madison’s 
neutrality policy indirectly facilitated this issue. Although the American government 
prohibited its citizens from direct participation in the civil war, the private munitions trade 
amongst individuals was considered rightful act of international trade.66 Spanish 
American agents and North American merchants became very skilled at navigating the 
various loopholes embedded in the old 1794 Act.67  
To complicate matters, the commissions given to American seamen helped 
deepen trade relationships first established in the early days of the French Revolution. 
Hemispheric free trade was a major goal for state economic goals, and therefore the 
vast tonnage of American made goods transported to the lucrative South American 
ports was not initially seen as a completely bad deal.68 Though the threat of war kept 
the government from overtly supporting the fight, these privateers nonetheless acted in 
the interest of U.S. political elite. A weak Spain would no doubt help expansionist 
politicians achieve their major goal of annexing Florida for the United States, as many in 
the government believed Florida was the key to securing America’s southern border.69 
                                                      
65 Keen, 111. 
66 Head, 23. 
67 Head, 23. 
68 Thomas F. O'Brien. Making the Americas: The United States and Latin America from the Age 
of Revolutions to the Era of Globalization. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007. 23. 
69 Lewis, James E. The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood: The United States 




“Florida,” Monroe proclaimed in 1815, “is of the highest importance.”70 This was a 
delicate and dangerous balance though. Initially, from 1815 to 1816, these privateers 
served American interests to a weaken Spain and expand South American markets. 
The munition trade was big businesses, as port cities like Baltimore collected huge 
revenue from port fees and taxes.71 Privateers were also aiding in goal of expanding 
free trade into the Caribbean and South American markets, as they helped force open 
the cracks established in Spanish mercantilist economy.72 But, these agents of 
American interests metastasized into agents of chaos as their indiscriminate marauding 
took America’s leadership to the edge of war.  
However, U.S. diplomats initially downplayed the seriousness of the privateering 
threat placed on American Atlantic peace. The dramatic rise in privateer activity against 
Spain from 1815 to 1816 resulted in immediate complaints from the Spanish minster in 
America, Don Luis Onís. American policy makers at the time cared little about the agent 
from Spain. Adams once quipped that Onís was “cold, calculating, and wily,” and 
possessed the characteristics of a “finished scholar in the Spanish procrastination 
school of diplomacy.”73 Onís wasted no time rising concern about blatant violations of 
America’s neutrality policy, pointing explicitly to U.S. ammunition, men, and supplies 
sent to Cartagena.74 Onís often complained to Washington armed with the exact names 
of men and ships who broke neutrality.75 In a diplomatic letter to Onís in early 1816, 
Monroe explained to the Spanish minister that the U.S. righteously observed the neutral 
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obligations and privileges expressed in the 1794 Act, and that America did nothing to 
aid or hinder either warring party.76 Monroe and Adams will react to future complaint by 
giving Onís this usual response. With faith in the legal system to bring justice to any 
violator, American statesmen for the remainder of 1816 dismissed Spanish complaints 
as rumors or accusations lacking the necessary proof of support.77 By dismissing the 
various concerns voiced by Spanish and Portuguese officials, American leaders were 
testing the flexibility of their neutral policy. Though South American privateering 
disproportionately preyed upon Spanish ships, neither President Madison nor Secretary 
of State Monroe was willing to curtail or recognize the obvious violations. As the White 
House changed hands, this issue, left unchecked by the Madison administration, would 
come to a head in the following years.  
James Monroe assumed more than just the presidency in 1816. He also inherited 
a legacy of expansionist policies that characterized his presidential predecessors. 
Although the United States had been pushing westward since colonial times, the most 
significant event in recent years was Thomas Jefferson’s “Louisiana Purchase.” With 
this land grab, Jefferson sough to transform the U.S. into a hemispheric “empire of 
liberty.” 78  Monroe inherited this set of expansionist ideals that connected state security 
to territorial growth. 79 With the return of peace in 1815, U.S. politicians cast their gaze 
south, towards Florida, the Caribbean, and even distant Spanish Texas.80  
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Expansion in the Early Republic was not limited to territory, for U.S. merchants 
and economic elites eagerly sought to extend trade relationships in the years following 
the War of 1812. With its lucrative exports of coffee, sugar, rum, and Latin American 
specie, no market was more important to future American economic growth than 
Cuba.81 Adams later wrote that Cuba was, at the time, “an object of transcendent 
importance to the political and economic importance of our Nation.”82 Senator John C. 
Calhoun concurred, claiming in 1818 that “trade with Havana alone” was the most 
important source of specie for the U.S., without which the U.S. economy would be an 
“embarrassment.”83 Protecting the Cuban trade relationship from war, therefore, was a 
matter of national security. As influential American General Thomas Jesup proclaimed, 
“Cuba [is] the key to all western America, whether we consider it in a military, political, 
or economic point of view.”84  
This aggressive expansionism also bred fear, as Monroe and his contemporaries 
were deeply concerned about European intervention in the Western Hemisphere. 
Having had Britain invade their home twice and been in hemispheric proximity to 
various European interactions in the Caribbean and South America, the American 
political elite believed that European powers would continue to interference in American 
political matters. U.S. leadership especially feared any reason that would invite England 
to increase their presence in the Caribbean. General Jesup further explained, “we have 
nothing to fear from Cuba in the feeble hands of Spain, but in the hand of Great Britain, 
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it [would] become so formidable as to menace the independence of our country.”85 
Therefore, for James Monroe, who saw this threat of intervention, especially from Great 
Britain, as “dangerous to our peace and safely,” American national security must be 
calculated within the range of the whole Atlantic.86 In the following years, from 1816 to 
1818, various external and internal threats grew to threaten the status quo carefully 
constructed by the architects of American strategic neutrality.  
Given the near ideological fear of European intervention in the Western 
Hemisphere, President Monroe understood that navigating the volatile Atlantic as a 
neutral nation required a high degree of caution and attentiveness. Calling his approach 
“watchful waiting,” Monroe’s foreign policy strategy was deliberately slow and cautious, 
allowing him to react appropriately to events that could threaten both war and his 
expansionist goals.87 In action, “watchful waiting” meant that Monroe would use 
neutrality to his advantage, as a guide for future policies and decisions aimed at 
maximizing American interests while keeping the nation out of war. By 1819, the 
Transcontinental Treaty exemplified the success of Monroe’s cautious policy, but, in 
order to get there, Monroe had to face serious challenges that, if not handled properly, 
could send America to war with Spain.  
 The first political challenge to test Monroe’s neutral policy was the continuation 
and growth of American privateering in South American waters. During Monroe’s 
presidency, the privateering problem exploded, as more than 3,000 North Americans 
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took to the sail during his first term.88 It was not only individual citizens caught up in the 
extralegal affair, whole cities became complicit in the privateering enterprise. Baltimore, 
in particular, saw privateering as a business, and profits from the high seas enterprise 
benefitted almost all sectors of the Baltimore economy.89 One infamous Baltimorean 
merchant David Didier, looked forward to the personal economic benefits another war, 
so that “we may make use of our fast schooners.”90 To make matters worse, by late 
1817 and 1818, many American privateers began to turn piratical, preying on all 
vessels, including fellow American ships.91  
The increased scope, frequency, and range of attack (Spanish officials in Cadíz 
claimed to see American ships off the Spanish Coast) resulted in the increased uproar 
voiced by Spanish and Portuguese governments.92 Onís now derided the Monroe 
Administration for its poor control over its own citizens, saying, “the mischiefs resulting 
from the toleration of the armament of privateers in the ports of this Union, and of 
bringing into them, with impunity, the plunder made by these privateers on the Spanish 
trade,” demanded for “the punishment, according to the law, of those turbulent and 
seditious individuals who have taken up arms within the territory of this confederation, 
and from these carrying desolation, destruction and horror into the frontier provinces of 
the Crown of Spain.” Onís then twisted the knife of international embarrassment into 
Monroe, saying that these actions “so deeply compromise the neutrality of the United 
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States in the eyes of all nations.”93 Criticism like these hit home, as in 1816, British 
officials claimed it was “common knowledge” within the international community that the 
U.S. was routinely breaking its neutrality laws.94 
 The rising number of marauding corsairs was not the only external threat to 
American neutrality faced by Monroe early on into his term. In late 1816, a group of 
South American agents led by the Chilean patriot José Miguel Carrera entered the 
United States on a mission to have the U.S. government directly finance their revolution. 
Although the government quickly rebuked their offer, the “Carrera Cabal” nevertheless 
met with some of the richest and most influential Americans at the time, including De 
Witt Clinton, Arron Burr, Thurlow Weed, and John Jacob Astor.95 While none of these 
Americans gave in to the Chilean’s demands, the fact that South American 
revolutionaries could so openly petition a neutral nation’s most powerful individuals 
revealed how fragile America’s Atlantic peace actually was.  
Although, by the summer of 1817, an even greater threat to Monroe’s neutrality 
was washing up on the shore of Amelia Island. Located off the coast of Florida, Amelia 
Island was a small plot of land controlled by Spain. In June of 1817, Gregor MacGregor, 
a Scottish adventurer and soldier of fortune, seized the island’s small Spanish garrison, 
raised the “Green Cross of Florida,” and thusly claimed the island for himself.96 
MacGregor’s island republic may have been small, but its impact was significant. 
Having a rouge dictatorship within miles of the U.S. mainland was an international 
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embarrassment for a neutral state, as MacGregor’s republic became both a pirate den, 
illegal slave trade trafficker, and contraband market.97 
 Not all threats came in the form of foreign actors, as one of the most persistent 
issue discrediting U.S. neutrality resulted from its very own judicial system. The same 
popular opinion that inspired so many citizens to name their children “Bolivar” also 
resulted in friendly juries for those privateers who fought for the young South American 
republics. In particular, the Maryland District Court in Baltimore was notoriously friendly 
to convicted privateers, as its judges dismissed two-thirds of the cases that came before 
them.98 In one infamous case, Spanish ministers brought to court documented proof of 
privateering activity committed by notorious Baltimorean merchant Thomas Taylor, 
however, despite such strong evidence, it only took the judge ten minutes to acquit 
Taylor of all wrongful acts.99 Adjudicating neutrally law confused even the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States John Marshall, who noted the “difficulty there 
may be, under our municipal institutions, in punishing as pirates, citizens of the U.S. 
who take from a State as war with Spain, a commission to cruise against that power.”100 
All these issues bringing justice against real violations of international neutrality caused 
Spanish ministers to proclaim that it was “impossible” for Spain to achieve justice in 
American courts.101 Although admiralty courts eventually gave Spain the justice she 
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deserved, in the early years of his first term, Monroe could not even count on his 
judiciary to protect his government from threats to his neutrality policy.102 
In the face of all these various external and internal threats, Monroe did not sit 
idly by. Confident in his slow and careful approach, Monroe was deliberate and 
calculating in how he went about defusing these dangers. The White House at this time 
truly believed that one wrong or overly aggressive move could trigger a disastrous war 
against Spain and its ally Great Britain.103 Therefore, opportunistic patience was a 
critical factor in Monroe’s ultimate success, as “watchful waiting” eventually paid off in 
the signing of the Transcontinental Treaty in 1819. Monroe’s strategy for combating the 
issues threatening state neutrality was a two-prong attack that centered on domestic 
politics and foreign military action.  
 The first step was to amend some of the obvious flaws in the old 1794 Neutrality 
Act. By 1817, Monroe and others were convinced that the old act could not serve the 
purposes of a revolutionary Atlantic. One of the most glaring and damning flaws was 
that, while the old act clearly banned the U.S. Government from selling arms to 
belligerents, it said nothing about the private sale of munitions from one American 
individual to another foreign citizen.104 The 1794 Act also did not explicitly say anything 
about the role colonies played on the international stage. Thus, in the first months of 
1817, President Monroe began the process of enacting a new Neutrality Act that would 
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better serve the current needs of his administration and protect the U.S. government 
from his opportunistic privateering constituents.  
MacGregor and his Amelia Island republic was a more sensitive situation. This 
issue dominated October cabinet meetings, as policymakers wrestled with the idea of 
breaking up the notorious pirate den, and if that action would cause Spain to react in 
war.105  Monroe ultimately reasoned that since it was evident that MacGregor’s camp 
was made for “smuggling, if not piratical purposes,” then the U.S. Government had the 
right to seize the island.106 Secretary of State Adams put the decision more bluntly, “the 
marauding parties at Amelia and Galveston [must] be broken up immediately.”107 
Although this sort of American interventionism seems normal activity to the modern 
reader, in 1817, this clearly non-neutral attack on foreign soil was a bold and dramatic 
move calculated to swiftly end the destabilizing threat of pirates. Thus, this attack 
revealed Monroe’s willingness to use a centralized show of force to defeat threats to his 
administration’s agenda. The seizure of Amelia was more than a symbolic step closer to 
the goal of acquiring Florida, it revealed a turning point in Monroe’s usage of state 
neutrality, as direct intervention used in the protection of neutrality was now a strategy. 
108 In claiming that U.S. state neutrally was under attack, Monroe was able bend 
American neutrally to suit his administration’s goals.  
 Monroe also used covert diplomatic action to protect neutrality. In 1817, Monroe 
commissioned three American agents on secret fact-finding mission to South America. 
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The purpose of this trip was to acquire first-hand intelligence on the progress of the civil 
war.109 For this mission, the Monroe Administration chose Caesar Augustus Rodney, 
John Graham, and Henry Brackenridge to represent the neutral attitudes of the U.S. 
government.110 Richard Rush, acting Secretary of State, wrote to the men explaining by 
their government need their service in this transnational drama: 
The contest, by the extension of the revolutionary movement and the 
greater stability which it appears to have acquired, becomes daily of more 
importance to the United States. It is by success that the colonists acquire 
new claims on other powers, which it may comport neither with their 
interests nor duty to disregard. Several of the colonies having declared 
their independence and enjoyed it some years, and the authority of Spain 
being shaken in others, its seems probable that, if the parities be left to 
themselves, the most permanent political changes will be effected. It 
therefore seems incumbent on the United States to watch the movement 
in its subsequent steps with particular attention.111 
 
  This was a shrewd diplomatic move, as Monroe sought clarity before taking any public 
steps towards recognizing the rebelling governments. Although patriot forces under 
Bolívar and San Martín were making progress by 1817, Monroe still feared that any 
premature move in overt favor of the South Americans would offend the monarchal 
powers of Europe and give them cause to join Spain against the republican 
revolutionaries.112 Thus, before Monroe took any steps closer to recognize the new 
republics, he had to get tangible information on the ground. The information gained by 
this mission will embolden the president, allowing him more flexibility to bend U.S. 
neutrality in the nation’s interest.   
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 Due to the various proactive steps taken in 1817 to mend Atlantic tensions and 
better secure the U.S. position, Monroe was well positioned for a December address 
Congress and members of the Senate.113 This address was important, as Monroe would 
not only reaffirmed the nation’s neutrality policy but also elevated the status of the 
revolutionaries to “equals” with Spain.114 Although far from a declaration of recognition 
for southern independence, this address acknowledged that patriot victory could be a 
reality. As Monroe openly stated, since the “early stages,” the Wars for South American 
Independence were “highly interesting to the United States.”115  Therefore, establishing 
friendly discourse now would help facilitate post-revolution friendships. Nevertheless, 
this was no doubt a major diplomatic slight against imperial Iberia. Additionally, the 
president even appeared to offer a justification for his citizens caught up in patriotic 
republican fervor, saying “it was natural that our citizens should sympathize in events 
which affected their neighbors.”116 Finally, in a precursor to the Monroe Doctrine’s future 
theme, Monroe made a bold assertion for the status of the nation’s rights and privileges 
along its borders. Speaking of raids against pirates at Amelia and Galveston, Monroe 
said:  
 
This enterprise has been marked in a more signal manner by all the 
objectionable circumstances . . . and more particularly by the equipment of 
privateers which have annoyed our commerce, and by smuggling. These 
establishments if ever sanctioned by any authority whatever . . . have 
abused their trust and forfeited all claims to consideration. A just regard for 
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the rights and interests of the United States required that they should be 
suppressed, and order have been accordingly issued to that effect.117  
 
Although Monroe’s first annual address revealed how the president considered state 
security linked to foreign policy, there were still some issues raised. Monroe was open 
about the fact that diplomatic progress with Spain was stalled, and had not moved since 
the Madison years. Despite all the peripheral actions aimed at maintaining peace, 
Monroe still had not dealt with the main national security threat: a porous neutrality law. 
As privateers still roamed the Atlantic threatening American security, Monroe in late 
1817 reaffirmed the “impartial neutrality” of the United States.118 By doing so, the 
president circled 1818 as the pivotal year to create a new neutrally law that allowed the 
watchful and waiting Washington elite to achieve their expansionist goals.   
 Due to a series of planned and spontaneous events, the year 1818 became a 
turning point in the establishment of a more secure American neutrality. Although the 
process began in 1817, by 1818, Monroe finally had a substantial revision in place to fix 
the porous 1794 act. Jokingly labeled by Congress as a “peace treaty between Spain 
and this city of Baltimore,” the 1818 revision fixed the major oversights in the 1794 Act 
that allowed so many privateers to be fitted out in American ports.119 However, approval 
of this revision was not unanimous amongst American politicians. The most vocal critic 
of this policy change was Henry Clay, senator from Kentucky. An ardent nationalist, 
Clay believed that the U.S. should drop all pretenses of neutrality and openly recognize 
the South American governments. Clay feared Europe, and especially England, 
monopolizing South American wealth. To Clay, if the U.S. did not recognize the rebel 
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governments and entrench future trading relationships, then America could remain "sort 
of independent colonies of England—politically free, commercially slaves.”120 In Clay’s 
mind, whatever the risk, the state benefited from all actions and policies that contributed 
to the continued dissolution of the Spanish Empire.  
However, Clay’s vision of a hemispheric economic relationship was built out of 
unrealistic idealism and not practical realities, as trade with the Caribbean was far more 
profitable and did not risk America’s neutrality in the process.121 Therefore, in a vote of 
115 to 45, Congress reaffirmed the careful policy of watchful waiting. Along with the 
Amelia and Galveston missions, this victory represented another strong centralized 
move by President Monroe aimed at stabilizing Atlantic chaos in America’s favor. Proof 
of this increased sense of stability and confidence showed up in March 1818, when 
Congress, for the first time, openly debated diplomatically recognizing the new South 
American republics.122 Although Monroe would not formally recognize them until 1822, 
this bold move made in the face of Spain could not have been made before now. In 
strengthening the nation’s defenses against the individual actors who risked war, 
Monroe’s Neutrality Act of 1818 positioned the U.S. one step closer to achieving a 
lasting peace settlement with Spain and other European interventionists.123 
 The Neutrality Act of 1818 was the culmination of a multiyear effort to protect 
American impartiality in a chaotic Atlantic World. Whereas the revision was a deliberate 
and thought-out event, U.S. General Andrew Jackson thrived in spontaneity. Having 
once claimed that he was “born for the storm,” Old Hickory was a man of action, and in 
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1818, he invaded Spanish Florida, capturing several forts in the process.124 Jackson’s 
Florida invasion could have resulted in a diplomatic disaster, as Monroe acknowledged 
in a letter to James Madison, that the capturing of Spanish forts could be seen as a 
violation of the neutrality act.125 However, instead of ruining Monroe’s watchful waiting 
policy, it actually revealed the strengths of Monroe’s diplomacy. American leaders have 
long coveted the Florida territory, and Monroe saw in Jackson’s aggression an 
opportunity to expose Spanish institutional weakness for American territorial gain.126 In 
a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Monroe explained his strategy: 
The occurrence at Pensacola, has been full of difficulty, but without 
incurring the charge of committing a break of the Constitution, or of giving 
the Spanish just cause for war, we have endeavored to turn it into the best 
account of our country, and credit the Commanding General. We shall tell 
the Spanish Minister [Onís], that the post will be delivered up, but that their 
attack, was owing to the misconduct of the Spanish officers, whose 
punishment would be . . . [that America] must keep a strong force in 
Florida.127  
 
By not condemning Jackson and blaming instead the Spanish for the invasion, Monroe 
spun U.S. military aggression into a defensive act protecting national neutrality. In doing 
so, he revealed the power and strength embedded in the flexible neutrality he had been 
crafting. Monroe therefore spun Jackson’s recklessness into political gain, as the White 
House “punished” Spanish “misconduct” by occupying their territory. “As long as we do 
not wound too deeply her pride by holding [Florida],” Monroe conspired, “there is much 
reason to presume that this act will furnish strong inducement to Spain to cede the 
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territory.”128 Watchful waiting may have been a slow-play policy, but it was by no means 
passive. Rather, it centered on the active use of strategic and flexible neutrally and 
required a keen eye for seizing opportunity in the moment. By “taking and holding all of 
Florida,” Monroe’s actions show that he was actively using a contradictory neutrality 
policy for state-building purposes.129 As a result, Monroe revealed Spanish weaknesses 
and forced them to negotiations that would at long last stabilize America’s Atlantic 
relations. 
* * * * * 
From the years 1816 to 1818, President James Monroe crafted a foreign policy 
for a chaotic Atlantic that centered on a flexible and sometimes contradictory neutrality 
law. Although this policy was at times contrary to America’s impartiality pledge, it 
nonetheless served to achieve significant state-building goals of the expansionist 
politicians. U.S. neutrally law was born with commerce in mind, and American politicians 
of the Early Republic utilized the post War of 1812 peace to extend the economy into 
the Spanish Atlantic.130 The generation of American statesmen who took power in 1815 
faced the challenge of producing a foreign policy that allowed for territorial expansion 
and that protected trade in the lucrative Caribbean and South American markets. Given 
the widespread and real fear within these diplomats over European interventionist 
actions, Presidents Madison and Monroe embraced and redefined Washingtonian 
neutrality to fit the purposes of a new volatile Atlantic world. Whereas it was Madison 
who initially declared America’s impartiality in the South American Wars for 
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Independence, Monroe was the president who best used U.S. neutrality to the nation’s 
advantage. Although he openly condemned the individual privateers who attacked the 
Spanish, Monroe himself was not afraid to bend American neutrality by strategically 
deploying violence against Spanish territory.  
Neutrality in Monroe’s hands was neither impartial nor noninterventionist. His 
administration, as well as the vast majority of the U.S. public, supported the Spanish 
colonists who fought Spanish imperial rule. He also allowed for the seizure of Spanish 
land, which included several islands and the whole territory of Florida. However, 
Monroe’s unique definition of neutrality was far from careless. In a deliberate and 
careful policy he called “watchful waiting,” the U.S. president maneuvered Atlantic 
diplomacy with patience and a keen eye for opportunity. Using both foreign action and 
domestic legislation when individually called for, Monroe by 1819 had not only avoided 
war but also positioned his leading diplomat John Quincy Adams to make a 
transcendent peace treaty with Spanish Minister Onís.131 The 1819 Transcontinental 
Treaty, also known as the Adam-Onís Treaty, ceded all of Spanish Florida to the United 
States, as well as officially defining the western border of the Louisiana Purchase 
territory.132 Until the Monroe Doctrine five years later, this treaty marked a defining 
achievement for the Monroe administration. Secretary of State Adams proclaimed "the 
acquisition of Florida has long been an object of earnest desire to this country. The 
acknowledgment of a definite line of boundary to the south sea forms a great epoch in 
our history."133 This epoch was also triumphed by the popular press, as one newspaper 
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stated, “in a word, it is a treaty more than which the most sanguine have not anticipated 
to be more favorable. It is one that fully comes up the expectations of the great body of 
the American people."134 With this treaty signed, Monroe secured a national security, 
territorial, and economic victory, as the Floridian land secured the vulnerable underbelly 
of the American state. Peace also guaranteed the existence of the vital Cuban trade 
relationship to American markets. Therefore, the Transcontinental Treaty represented 
the crowning achievement of Monroe’s watchful waiting, a neutrality policy that set the 
stage for future state growth. Although the Monroe Doctrine will be remembered as the 
most significant foreign policy achievement, Monroe’s willingness to embrace the 
contrary values of "consensus and fragmentation,” “continuity and innovation,” and 
“change and stagnation,” he created the stability necessary for such a proclamation to 
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Chapter 3: Money Bags and Cannon Balls: The First Bribery War and the Expansion of 




                                    "What is practical must often control what is pure theory" 




The morning of October 31st, 1803 broke bright with opportunity for Captain 
William Bainbridge, commander of the forty-two gun American frigate, the USS 
Philadelphia. Operating under the orders of America’s third Mediterranean commodore 
in three years, Edward Prebel, Bainbridge and the Philadelphia were a part of an 
American blockade of the Tripolitan coastline. In 1803, this naval noose was President 
Thomas Jefferson’s answer to a series of piratical actions on American merchant 
vessels committed by the North African regencies, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. 
Together, these states were known as the Barbary Coast. Preble’s orders, given to him 
by the Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith indicated that he was “at liberty to pursue the 
dictates of [his] own judgement” to conduct a blockade against Tripoli and, in doing so, 
“annoy the enemy” with “all the means in [his] power.”136 On the 31st of October, Captain 
Bainbridge saw his opportunity to “annoy the enemy” when a Tripolitan ketch attempted 
to slip past his blockade. Bainbridge gave chase, and in the shallow Mediterranean 
waters, Bainbridge ran his frigate aground on a bed of reefs.137 Unable to free the heavy 
ship and within range of Tripoli’s naval batteries, Bainbridge surrendered the 
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Philadelphia to the Bey of Tripoli without firing a shot.138 That morning, not only did  the 
United States of America lose one of its most impressive ships but also its crew of three 
hundred and seven American citizens, who would now be enslaved by Tripoli’s Islamic 
regency. Jefferson called this black day a “national stain,” and the “most serious 
[disaster] which has happened to the present administration.”139  
Jefferson’s strong reaction to this capture resulted from his core Republican 
belief in the value of free  oceanic trade. With the loss of British protection after the 
successful American Revolution, North African corsairs began seizing American ships 
and sailors in 1784.140 By 1794, these Barbary attacks reached crisis level, with more 
than eleven American vessels captured and more then 120 citizens enslaved.141 As a 
response to “the depredations committed by the Algerine corsairs on the commerce of 
the United States,” the George Washington administration called for the creation of a 
standing American Navy, and in March, 1794, Congress enacted its first Navy Bill, as a 
means to protect the young republics’ commercial independence. 142 
 Despite creating a Navy for the protection of American trade against North 
African privateers, the Federalist administrations of both George Washington and John 
Adams sought resolution through tributes rather than cannon balls. By bribing the 
Muslim regencies, Americans could regain access to the lucrative Mediterranean trade 
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unmolested. However, these tributes came at an incredible cost.143 Just one peace deal 
with Algiers, by far the most prolific threat to shipping in the 1790s, cost the U.S. both 
one million dollars and a thirty-six gun American-made frigate. Seeing Algiers’s success 
in forcing America into tributary status, Morocco, Tripoli, and Tunis also threaten attacks 
in return for tribute. A full Mediterranean peace was achieved by 1797, but the price of 
opening up the sea for commerce cost one and a half million dollars, totaling to twenty 
percent of the national budget.144 This was a crippling strain on the federal treasury, as 
the young nation relied on its export trade as a primary means to pay off the immense 
debt earned by the American War for Independence.145 
 For nearly two decades, Thomas Jefferson watched as Barbary “pirates” injured 
and threatened American free trade in the Mediterranean. A firm believer in the 
republican concept of “free ships make free goods,” Jefferson viewed these North 
Africans attacks and subsequent tributes as dangers to the future success and growth 
of the United States. As a republican, Jefferson believed that nations, like human 
beings, had a lifespan, and therefore, these Mediterranean attacks represented assaults 
on a vital trade artery responsible for keeping the young United States vibrant and 
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free.146 Thus, Jefferson rejected the Federalist approach of his predecessors as 
damaging future American progress. Claiming himself to be the “enemy of all these 
douceurs, tributes, and humiliations,” Jefferson rejected the notion that America could 
purchase peace from the Barbary Coast. Ever since his time as Minister to France in 
the 1780s, Jefferson had remained steadfast in his belief that “nothing will stop the 
eternal increase from these pirates but the presence of an armed force” in the 
Mediterranean.147 Although he lacked the political power to dictate national foreign 
policy as a minister and vice president, by 1801, Thomas Jefferson was in the White 
House finally handing him the power to apply his long standing demand for military 
action.148  
Since 1786, Jefferson nursed his conviction that the American government 
should stand up to the Barbary Coast with force instead of tribute.149 In 1801 when he 
won the presidency, Jefferson received his chance to apply his longstanding rhetoric 
into action. However, the Barbary War that will come to Jefferson in 1801 and last until 
1805 will be a moment that tests Jefferson’s own republican convictions. Although 
Jefferson came into office wielding a coherent and longstanding strategy, when faced 
with the realities of war, Jefferson will be compelled to abandon his Republican principle 
in order to achieve the military victory his agrarian vision for the U.S. demanded. The 
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Barbary War against Tripoli therefore illustrates a moment of transition for President 
Jefferson, a time in which Republican rhetoric was challenged by the ever-changing 
dynamics of trans-Atlantic warfare. In order to achieve his Republican goals, Jefferson 
adopted federalist strategies. A turning point in this transition hit Jefferson in 1803, 
when news of the Philadelphia disaster came to Washington. The Philadelphia capture  
turned a war fought with limited means into a time sensitive humanitarian crisis, which 
compelled Jefferson to change his tactics against the Tripolitans. Challenged by a 
moment of international crisis, the Barbary War revealed Jefferson’s republican 
character as both flexible and adaptable, a leadership style allowed him to successfully 
project and protect American interest across the ocean. Using Federalist means to 
achieve Republican goals, Jefferson defined the role of Commander-in-Chief, and as a 
result,  significantly expanded the power of the executive unlike any president before 
him. 
* * * * * 
Jefferson’ character has been a topic of scholarly fascination for many years. 
Even Jefferson’s  founding peers noted his complex enigmatic personality. Friend and 
political rival John Adams explained that, whereas “almost every other American 
statesman might be described in . . . broad brush strokes . . . Jefferson could be painted 
only touch by touch, with a fine pencil and the perfection of the likeness depend upon 
the shifting and uncertain flicker of the semi-transparent shadows.”150 Modern historians 
too have struggled to catch Jefferson in the right light. Through the years, scholars have 
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portrayed the Virginian as everything from an atheist to a zealot.151 However, the best 
scholarship about the man stays away from the hardline moral absolutes found in 
Jefferson works during the 1960s-90s. Since 1990, historians have leaned into the 
moral and ideological complexities that characterize Jefferson. Authors like Joseph Ellis, 
Peter Onuf, Gordon Wood, and Jon Meacham have all written excellent accounts of 
Jefferson’s character. Whereas Ellis’ well-titled 1997 book American Sphinx painted 
Jefferson as more ideologically rigid, recent scholarship, like John Boles’ Jefferson: 
Architect of American Liberty readily acknowledges the man’s mysteries, writing, “in the 
end, [Jefferson] is the most attractive, most elusive, most complicated, most intellectual, 
most practical, most idealistic, most flexible, and most quintessentially American 
Founder of them all.”152 It is within this idea of Jefferson as the most practical, idealistic, 
and flexible that I engage the man. Jon Meacham wrote in Thomas Jefferson: The Art of 
Power, “to realize his vision, [Jefferson] compromised and improvised. The willingness 
to do what he needed to do in a given moment makes him an elusive historical figure. 
Yet in the real world, in real time, when he was charged with the safety of the nation, his 
creative flexibility made him a transformative leader.”153 Meacham’s desire to find place 
Jefferson in real time and in the real world corresponds with my argument, but unlike 
many of these historians, I will engage Jefferson’s within the real world of trans-Atlantic 
warfare. 
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However, within the vast literature surrounding Jefferson, very few historians 
have engaged Jefferson’s character through the lens of foreign policy. Writing in 1990, 
historians Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson co-authored Empire of Liberty, which 
instantly became the preeminent source on Jeffersonian foreign policy. In their view, 
Jefferson directed the ship of state with a strong idealistic and moralistic vision. 
However, Tucker and Hendrickson only analyzed Jefferson’s diplomacy in domestic and 
European issues. Except for five pages of endnotes, the Barbary War of 1801-1805 was 
almost completely omitted from their study, and even there, they consider the war “less 
than vital to the state.”154 Two decades later, Francis Cogliano revisited and revised the 
modern scholarship regarding Jeffersonian diplomacy. His 2014 book, Emperor of 
Liberty now stands as the best account of Jefferson’s role as foreign diplomat from his 
early political career and into his presidency. In line with the recent Jefferson 
historiography, Cogliano rejects Tucker and Hendrickson’s view of Jefferson the idealist, 
and instead, Cogliano argues that Jefferson was a realist. “Although he was guided by a 
clear ideological vision for the American republic,” Cogliano argues, “he was pragmatic 
about the means he employed to protect the republic and advance its strategic 
interests.”155 Unlike Tucker and Hendrickson, Cogliano analyses the Barbary War as 
proof of Jefferson’s consistent view of foreign policy.  
This paper will advance the recent scholarship about Jefferson’s foreign policy by 
using the Barbary Wars as a case study for the transformation in leadership 
characteristics witnessed during his presidency. Although the Barbary War  has been 
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covered by popular and military historians, it remains an understudied episode in 
Thomas Jefferson’s political career.156 Whereas Cogliano argued that Jefferson 
employed a consistent vision and strategy against Tripoli, I argue that the capture of the 
USS Philadelphia was an important turning point in Jefferson’s presidency, compelling 
him to adopt a more Federalist approach towards achieving his republican goals. 157 
Whereas other historians have noted Jefferson’s flexibility, few have analyzed it within 
the crucible of war. Thus, this paper situates the Barbary War as a moment that defined 
Jefferson’s transformative pragmatism. That transformation challenged Jefferson’s 
Republican committed towards running a frugal and small government. By 1805, 
Jefferson had successfully achieved a peace that reopened the Mediterranean to free 
American trade, but to do so, he had to dramatically increase the power of the nascent 
American navy, enact a sweeping tax program, and become the first American 
president to endorse a foreign regime change through a revolutionary military coup 
d’état. 
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* * * * * 
Jefferson first articulated his desire to use force against the Barbary Coast in 
1786. At that time, the Washington administration dispatched Jefferson to Paris as 
America’s first Minister to France. Washington requested that Jefferson and John 
Adams, the Minister to England, articulate a U.S. strategy to handle the corsair crisis. In 
a diplomatic dispatch to Adams, Jefferson argued that the United States “should prefer 
the obtaining of [peace] by war,” and gave the following explanations for justifying his 
opinion: “Honor favors it . . . it will procure us respect in Europe, and respect is a 
safeguard to our interest . . . I think it least expensive.”158 Adams, however, countered 
Jefferson’s opinion, arguing that the more prudent move for the financially and militarily 
weak nation would be to purchase peace. Adam’s calculated that future trade earned in 
the Mediterranean would more than make up for the continued cost of tribute to the 
North African powers.159 President Washington agreed with Adams, and thus, his 1795 
peace with Algiers set a two decade long U.S precedent of buying and bribing the 
Barbary for peace.160 
In Jefferson’s mind, the direction of American foreign policy was a direct result of 
his Republican vision for an expansive agrarian republic. Believing that that “cultivators 
of the earth are the most valuable citizens,” Jefferson saw the “yeoman farmer” as the 
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backbone responsible for supporting the young United States’ agrarian future.161 These 
industrious and virtuous farmers were not to simply be subsistence producers, that 
would invite sloth upon the nation. Rather, they were to be the pushing force behind an 
expanding agrarian republic that sought growth from the virtues of agriculture rather 
than European-style manufacturing.162 The critical connecting factor to Jefferson’s 
vision of America’s political economy was therefore access to a vigorous overseas 
trade.163 Commerce and the maintenance  of free trade were intimately connected to 
Jefferson’s foreign policy objectives. If Jefferson’s yeomen did not have access to 
foreign markets, then they would risk slipping into stagnate subsistence farmers whose 
lazy and idle lifestyle was deemed detrimental to republican virtues. Thus, the protection 
of America’s Republican experience was critically connected to a secure and open trade 
route.164 In Jefferson’s mind,  American warfare, limited in scope and purposefully 
designed, protected American welfare.  
The belief in Mediterranean trade being a vital artery supporting American 
economic and moral health was not merely a lofty metaphysical concern. Rather, trade 
into the Mediterranean markets actually served as an important economic lifeline for an 
American economy desperate to pay off extensive debt incurred during the 
Revolutionary War. After the War for Independence, the U.S. became the largest 
neutral carrier of goods for the Western world. From 1700 to 1807, the value of all 
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goods involved in foreign trade expanded from 40% to 92%. In monetary terms, 
combined imports and exports in 1790 totaled to $43 million, and by 1807, that total 
skyrocketed to $246 million.165 Within that trade boom, Jefferson calculated that one-
sixth of all wheat and flour exported and a quarter of all dried and pickled fish went to 
Mediterranean ports. This Mediterranean trade involved more than one hundred ships 
annually, loaded with twenty thousand tons, and employed more than twelve hundred 
seamen.166 Therefore, when Barbary corsairs began threatening this vital trade route, 
Jefferson could only see these attacks as existential threats to the very future of 
America. Jefferson’s ideological commitment thus defined his reaction to the Barbary 
crisis, committing him to the firm belief that only force could save America’s agrarian 
future. Jefferson took both these ideological commitments and fears to Washington.  
Thomas Jefferson called his presidential election “the revolution of 1800,” but 
when war with Tripoli came to Jefferson in 1801, “continuity,” not “change,” will 
characterize his presidential leadership in the theatre of foreign policy.167 As the Barbary 
War illustrated, instead of dismantling an expansionist military and fiscal state, Jefferson 
actually empowered the federal government in a manner far beyond that of his federalist 
predecessors.168 In order to achieve victory against Tripoli and secure his Republican 
policy of free trade, Jefferson had to adopt strong-handed unilateral policies. Republican 
peace, therefore, took Federalist-inspired action. Although the Barbary War illustrates 
an ideology in transition, Jefferson was not a perfect war-time leader.169 As the nation’s 
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first Commander in Chief to lead a nation through open war, Jefferson conducted his 
war to protect trade in an uneven and largely ineffective manner, where his rhetoric of 
force rarely translated to real military action. Although the American Navy secured a 
victory in 1805, the war was plagued by mishaps, embarrassments, and missed 
opportunities for four years. Nevertheless, by the end of the Frist Barbary War, 
President Jefferson will have set a powerful precedent, that executives could wield the 
power of the national government to realize personal foreign policy goals.  
After years of preaching force, President Jefferson entered the White House in 
1801 and immediately sought to implement his vision of an interventionist U.S. foreign 
policy in the Mediterranean. By 1801, Tripoli had established itself as America’s primary 
North African adversary.170 In addition to recently violating the 1797 Treaty by capturing 
U.S. merchant vessels, the Bashaw of Tripoli demanded a tributary increase of $100,00 
to match that of Algiers. Condemning the idea of  tributes as “money thrown away,” 
Jefferson fumed that “there [was] no end to the demand of these powers, nor any 
security in their promises.”171 In response to this challenge, Jefferson called a cabinet 
meeting within the first several months of his administration to come up with a new state 
policy for this crisis. On May 20th, the cabinet signed off on a plan to dispatch a naval 
squadron of four frigates to the Mediterranean under the Command of Commodore 
Richard Dale. He ordered the Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith to command Dale to 
actively blockade the Tripoli’s port and use his force “so as best to protect our 
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commerce and chastise their insolence—by sinking, burning, or destroying their vessels 
wherever you shall find them.”172 
The ramifications of his command to sink, burn, or destroy the Bashaw’s corsairs 
shows the transitional nature of Jefferson’s character. Jefferson’s command essentially 
constituted an act of war. Furthermore, the president did not have the authority to 
engage in foreign war without Congressional approval. Jefferson’s unilateral decision 
illustrates his willingness to expand executive power in order to achieve his policy goals. 
This constitutional issue came to light in December 1801, when American Captain 
Andrew Sterrett engaged a Tripolitan naval ship and crippled it, killing over twenty of its 
crew.173 Sterrett’s naval victory was an example of Jefferson’s willingness to put rhetoric 
into action, at the same time, it also illustrated that Jefferson, not Congress, had taking 
the nation to war.174 This powerful unilateral move contradicted Jefferson’s inaugural 
promise to not enlarge the government or expand executive authority.175 However, in a 
display of political savvy, Jefferson heralded Sterrett as a war hero to Congress and 
asked Congress to retroactively approve of his military maneuvers. In “an Act for the 
protection of the Commerce and the Seamen of the United States against Tripolitan 
cruisers,” Congress legitimized Jefferson’s interventionist policy and empowered the 
president to use the U.S. Navy at his complete discretion, allowing him access to U.S 
treasury in order to build more ships.176 
                                                      
172 Robert Smith, May 21, 1801. Naval Docs. 1:472. 
173 Robert Allison, The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the Muslim World, 1776-1815. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 26.  
174 Cogliano, 154. 
175 Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address.” Quoted in, Edling, 108. 
176 “An Act for the protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United States, against the 
Tripolitan Cruisers,” February 6, 1802. Naval Docs, 2:51. 
 
 53 
In the larger scope of the war, the crippling of one small vessel hardly constituted 
an American victory. Nevertheless, it did symbolize that the Jefferson administration 
was serious about changing American policy in the Mediterranean. Although he had a 
military success and Congress’ blessing, Jefferson was unwilling to aggressively 
expand his interventionist agenda into an open and direct naval warfare against Tripoli. 
In Jefferson’s eyes, force meant the projection of force, and therefore, Jefferson sought 
a limited war against Tripoli that consisted of ineffective and porous blockades around 
the Muslim regency.177 Jefferson saw himself as “the enemy to all douceurs, tributes, 
and humiliations,” yet, his military strategy comprised of blockading the enemy’s ports 
with the “smallest force competent.”178 The three years of ineffective blockade and the 
weak projection of power compelled William Eaton, Consul of Tunis, to proclaim that 
“the Government may as well send out Quaker meeting-houses” to serve as the 
American Navy.179 
  Disaster, however, changed the course of the war, as it forced Jefferson to adopt 
a more aggressive military and diplomatic strategy in order to achieve victory.  The 1803 
captured of the USS Philadelphia by Tripolitan corsairs fundamentally transformed the 
nature of the war. Until this humiliating event, Jefferson felt no pressure to change his 
naval policy of limited, cost effective, blockades with conducted with “the smallest force 
competent.”180 However, with over three-hundred American citizens locked in the 
Bashaw’s dungeons, the Philadelphia capture turned the war into a humanitarian crisis 
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that demanded immediate resolution and policy change.181 These enslaved Americans 
placed a unique pressure on Jefferson, as their imprisonment and uncertain fate forced 
Jefferson to aggressively transform his approach to ending the war through force and 
diplomacy. Thus, the Philadelphia disaster was a turning point for the trajectory of the 
Barbary War, because it demanded from Jefferson a new style of executive leadership 
that was unilateral, centralized, and decisive. Far from the limited war he envisioned in 
1801, the post-Philadelphia Barbary War required a new commander in chief. As 
emblematic of an ideology in transition, Jefferson’s new strategy to defeat Tripoli was to 
harness the previously untapped power of the executive to achieve his foreign policy 
goals.182  
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, Jefferson reacted with both action and 
policy. Three months after the Philadelphia’s capture, the U.S. Navy enacted its 
revenge with  a December 1804 covert raid to blow up the stolen vessel in the Tripolitan 
harbor.183 Led by Lt. Steven Decatur, this unexpected attack sent shock waves across 
the Atlantic, inspiring British Royal Navy giant Horacio Nelson to call Decatur’s raid “the 
most bold and daring act of the age.”184 Unlike Captain Sterrett’s early success in 1801, 
Jefferson did not let positive momentum go to waste. Now that Jefferson had a war hero 
and the shot of optimism desperately needed to revive patriotism for the war effort, he 
moved to enact expansionist policies designed to bring the fight to the enemy.185    
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Jefferson rode this national optimism into military policy, demanded a naval 
expansion unlike any other. In March 1804, when news of the successful raid arrived in 
Washington, Secretary of State Robert Smith recorded Jefferson’s new strategic plan 
for the Barbary War: 
 
The President immediately determined to put in Commission and to 
send to the Mediterranean a force which would be able beyond the 
possibility of a doubt , to coerce the Enemy to a peace upon Terms 
compatible with our Honor and our Interest. A due regard to our situation 
with Tripoli and precautionary considerations in relation to the other 
Barbary Powers, demanded our forces in that quarter should be so far 
augmented as to leave no doubt of our compelling the existing Enemy to 
submit to our own terms, and of effectually checking any hostile 
disposition that might be entertained towards us by any of the other 
Barbary Powers.186 
 
Congress had passed Naval Bills in the past, but the piecemeal aspect of the 
previous bills in 1802 and 1803 were never followed by a change in both overall military 
strategy and North African diplomacy.187 In order to compel victory “without doubt,” 
Congress passed a new bill to allocate an additional one million dollars to create five 
new frigates.188 This fourth and final armada was led by Commodore Samuel Barron, 
who set sail against Tripoli six frigates, five schooners, two bomb ships, and ten smaller 
gun boats, two-hundred and sixty guns in all. Together, the cost of this final fleet 
exceeded $1.5 million, over three times the amount spent on the naval force dispatched 
in 1801.189 This enhanced and empowered squadron at last directly engaged Bashaw 
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Karamanli’s forces off the coast of Tripoli on August 3rd, 1804.190 The ensuing naval 
battles and American bombardment of Tripolitan naval fortresses represented a clear 
change in U.S. strategy towards the enemy. Action and attack, not simply blockades, 
now characterized the final year of the Barbary War.  
Such a commitment to a projection and usage of force abroad was incredibly 
expensive. During his 1801 inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson promised his 
constituencies a “frugal government” that would not shall not take from the mouth of 
labor the great it has earned.”191 Not wanting to directly tax American citizens as a 
means to raise the $1.5 million needed to pay for Barron’s fleet, Jefferson sought to 
enact tax revenue elsewhere. In what he called, “the Mediterranean Fund,” the 
president placed a 2.5% “ad valorem” duty on imports.192 Although he did not resort to 
taxing American citizens, this ambitious tax system nevertheless represented an 
expansion of the bureaucratic state by a president committed to a small and non-
intrusive government. Stressed by a crisis that demanded quick resolution, Jefferson 
had to abandon portions of his ideology that prevented him from achieving his foreign 
policy goals. In order to protect his nation’s right to free trade, Jefferson had to act like 
his Federalist predecessors by enacting a national revenue system designed fund a 
massive military expansion.  
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 The Philadelphia crisis did not just change Jefferson’s commitment to military 
force, it compelled Jefferson to reconsider the diplomatic channels available to facilitate 
peace. In addition to empowering his traditional foreign officers to act unilaterally in the 
best interest of American peace, Jefferson also took advantage of non-traditional means 
of diplomatic pressure.193 Since 1801, the Jefferson administration knew of an 
opportunity to use the Bashaw’s brother, Hamet Karamanli, as a tool to overthrow the 
existing hostile Bashaw government in Tripoli.194  Consul Eaton, who became the lead 
proponent of the coup plan, regularly wrote to Secretary of State James Madison 
through the years 1801-1803  arguing that an operation to restore the “rightful Bashaw” 
would “have saved the United States more than a million of dollars and many lives.”195 
In Eaton’s opinion, this was an “event which promises to a vast saving and perpetual 
peace to the U. States.”196 Eaton’s argument fell on deft ears for two years, until the 
Philadelphia’s inglorious capture forced Jefferson to reconsider the feasibility to this 
clandestine plan to overthrow Tripoli’s government.197 
It was not until Jefferson was faced with a time sensitive hostage crisis that he 
was willing to take the extreme executive privilege to initiate a covert coup attempt 
against the Bashaw. In doing so, Jefferson set significant precedent of American 
presidents using force to create a pro-American regime change in a Middle Eastern 
country. Two years earlier, the Jefferson administration was unwilling to involve itself 
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with the internal affairs of a foreign ruler. However, after 1803, Jefferson and Madison 
gave a tacit green-light to revolutionize Tripolitan politics. Writing to Consul General 
Tobias Lear in 1804, Madison wrote “of the co-operation of the Elder brother of the 
Bashaw of Tripoli we are still willing to avail ourselves, if the Commodore [Barron]  
should Judge that it may be useful.” In addition, Lear was ordered to work with Eaton in 
North Africa “in all such measures as may be deemed the best calculated to effectuate 
a termination” of the war.198 This direction corresponded with Eaton being named 
“Agent of the Navy for the Barbary Regencies,” and he was transported by the navy to 
Alexandria in order to find Hamet and commence the mission. In order to finance the 
operation, Barron was authorized to give Eaton $20,000 as a means to pay for men and 
supplies.199  
Although Jefferson never outright stated his approval, his government’s support 
was clear in its support, as evident in the formal title bestowed on Eaton (Eaton called 
himself “General Eaton”), the $20,000 to finance the mission, and in the navy transport 
that delivered him to Hamet. In a pact signed on February 23, 1805, Eaton pledged that 
he, and his U.S. forces (Eaton was given eight Marines and two sailors), would use “the 
utmost exertions, so far as comports with their own honor and interest” to instill Hamet 
as the rightful Bashaw of Tripoli. This pact was forwarded to Madison but never ratified 
by the Senate. Nevertheless, on March 8, Eaton began his mission understanding that 
he had the support of his government, and thus he commenced the five-hundred mile 
journey to Tripoli from Alexandria with Hamet and five-hundred Greek, Arab, and Berber 
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mercenaries in tow.200 Acting like an early 19th century Lawrence of Arabia, General 
Eaton marched his motely force across the North African desert to assault the strategic 
seaborne city of Derna, and after arduous six-week journey, on April 28, 1805, Eaton, 
supported by three American naval gunboats, attacked and secured the surrender of 
the city.201 After a two-hour battle, Eaton raised, for the first time, an American flag over 
a defeated enemy in a foreign land. Victory, however, proved bittersweet. Two months 
later as Eaton and Hamet were planning their attack on the Tripolitan capital, Lear and 
Bashaw Karamanli signed a peace treaty, officially ending the First Barbary 
War.202American peace, however, offered no provision for the so-called “rightful” 
Bashaw, as Eaton was ordered to return home and abandon Derna, leaving Hamet 
Karamanli stranded in his brother’s hostile land.203 
 
* * * * * 
Although peace had been reached in 1805, it was neither permanent nor 
popular.204 Yes the United States had bombarded Yusuf into the negotiation table, but 
the Bashaw still held his trump card, the three-hundred American souls locked away in 
his dungeons. In order to secure a peace that alleviated the hostage crisis, Tobias Lear 
agreed for the United States government to pay $60,000 in order to secure the safe 
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release of America’s imprisoned sailors.205 Thus, the Bashaw, even in defeat, was able 
to extract one more lump sum payment from a U.S. president who swore never to be a 
tribute to a Barbary Power. Upon hearing that Lear signed such a forgiving peace and 
ransom, Eaton seethed that “both honor and humanity bleeds” because of this 
humiliating treaty. However, Eaton aimed his fury and sense of betrayal most directly at 
President Jefferson. Calling Jefferson a “coward” and a “fraud in a mask,” Eaton raged 
that "Mr. Jefferson began his administration under the most promising auspices and the 
assurances he gave his country on the faith of his plighted power . . . he had discharged 
his promises to refine deceptions, frauds, and speculations on public confidence and 
incorrigible errors has strongly marked every stage of his prudential conduct."206  
 Eaton, however, missed the point. His strong criticism of Jefferson’s willingness 
to agree to an unfavorable peace speak to the personal attachment he felt to towards 
the important role he played in the conflict. However, this personal connection blinded 
his ability to view the wider trajectory of the war, and therefore, Eaton was unable to see 
how Jefferson’s war aims had transformed since 1801. At the start of the war, Jefferson 
was an outspoken proponent of a permanent peace secured through force. However, as 
soon as the Philadelphia disaster turned the war into a hostage crisis, Jefferson 
changed his strategy from a safe and economical tactic of blockade to a more direct and 
immediate strategy aimed at establishing a quick resolution to both America’s tribute 
system and hostage situation.207  
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 The four years it took to find resolution in the Frist Barbary War illustrated the 
complexity embedded into Thomas Jefferson’s character as America’s President and 
Commander in Chief. Although he had a clear idea of the outcome he had in mind, the 
means of achieving that successful military outcome was far from consistent or well 
defined. This strategic unevenness points to the larger picture seen in Jefferson’s war 
leadership, that Jefferson’s ideology experienced a point of transition. When his rhetoric 
of force came up against the realities of war, Jefferson adapted. A study of Jefferson’s 
decision making during the war reveals an ideological pragmatism that allowed him to 
maintain his overall goal of protecting free trade, while at the same time, adapting his 
principles to the changing demands of war.208 Seen in this light, the Barbary War 
against Tripoli created a moment in which Jefferson had to act against principles held 
since his early political career. This war was far from the only episode in Jefferson’s life 
to challenge is Republicanism, however, it was a significant in the precedent it set for 
future American leaders.209 In order to achieve his personal policy goals, harnessed the 
power of the national government in unpreceded ways. In doing so, Jefferson expanded 
his role of Commander in Chief like no other Federalist president before him. In the last 
two years of the war, Jefferson built the navy to unprecedented power at great expense, 
grew the federal government’s taxation network, and supported a plan to revolutionize a 
foreign government through a secret military coup. The First Barbary War from 1801 to 
1805 may now only be remembered as a line in the Marine Corps Hymn, but the 
ramifications it had on the presidency of Thomas Jefferson were transformative. Serving 
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as the United States’ first wartime Commander in Chief, Jefferson helped to define the 
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